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1. Introduction 
The latest financial crisis that began in 20071 and the evaporation of 
liquidity within international financial markets (which led to a global a recession of 
unprecedented proportions since the Great Depression of the 1930s2), showed the 
need for the development of an effective regulatory and supervisory framework 
for the financial sector comprising both binding and non-binding regulatory 
measures, that is, laws and regulatory standards of good practice (soft law) that 
would adequately address and limit the creation of risks within markets, not only 
at company level (risk profile of individual banks—micro-prudential risk 
assessment), but also at the market level (the creation systemic risks by shifting 
individual firms’ risks onto the global financial markets and the real economy—
macro-prudential analysis).3 
This failure to incorporate macro-prudential considerations within the 
regulatory framework when providing for minimum standards for the analysis of 
risk, catered for the excessive risk-taking on the part of financial institutions in 
the pursuit of higher profits and also for the creation of systemic risk4 within 
financial markets:5 risk was underpriced6 and spread within the financial system, 
which combined with the lack of adequate capital buffers among financial 
institutions, severely affected the most developed economies and financial 
markets across the world via contagion—which, in turn, made its way through 
procyclicality. This was further exacerbated by the moral hazard derived from the 
practice of bankers who, in the pursuit of ever increasing target-related rewards 
(e.g., bonuses), took excessive risks and transferred them onto the market via 
                                          
1 On 9th August according to the general consensus, kick-started by French bank BNP Paribas when it 
informed its investors that they would not ‘be able to take money out of two of its funds because it 
cannot value the assets in them, owing to a ‘complete evaporation of liquidity’ in the market’, 
evidencing the interruption of interbank lending and setting off a ‘sharp rise in the cost of credit (...) 
[making] the financial world realise how serious the situation was’; BBC News Channel, ‘Timeline: 
Credit Crunch to Downturn’ BBC News (London, 7 August 2009) <news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7521250.stm> 
accessed 12 March 2012. 
2 Fred Yeager and others, ‘US Legislation Designed to Improve Corporate Governance: an exploration’ 
(2012) 33(1) Company Lawyer 25, 31. 
3 Kern Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (2011) 8 Journal of International 
Banking and Financial Law 489, 489 and fn 20 citing Jean C Trichet (2009) ‘Macro-Prudential 
Supervision in Europe’, Text of the 2nd City Lecture, 
www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp091211_2.en.html: 
 
Micro-prudential supervision focuses mainly on the solvency and risk management 
practices of individual financial institutions, depositor protection and protecting bank 
investors (…) macro-prudential supervision involves assessing the aggregate risks 
developing in the financial system, the financial system infrastructure, and the linkages 
between financial institutions and markets and the risks of common shocks in the 
financial system. 
 
4 Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale and John Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems: The 
International Regulation of Systemic Risk (OUP 2006) 24, citing John Eatwell J and Lance Taylor, 
Global Finance at Risk (Free Press 2000): systemic risk is defined as ‘a negative externality that 
imposes costs on the society at large because financial firms fail to price into their speculative 
activities the full costs associated with their risky behaviour’. 
5 Through financial product innovation, eg, securitisation that decomposed and transferred credit risk 
among wholesale institutional investors looking for higher returns. Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International 
Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 489. See also Brian McDonnell, ‘Financial Regulation After the Storm: 
Heavy Hand After Light Touch’ (2008) 10 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 519 for 
an explanation of the securitisation process; BBC News Channel, ‘Timeline’ (n 1). 
6 Risk was underpriced because financial institutions accounted for only private estimations of risks 
(micro-prudential analysis) without any consideration given to the systemic risks created and shifted 
around markets (macro-prudential considerations). Alexander, Dhumale and Eatwell (n 4) 177. 
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securitisation and other engineered financial instruments—e.g., derivatives, 
collateralised debt obligations. 
In this respect, I believe it has been correctly stated that: 
 
Basel II embodied some of the major weaknesses with the current 
international financial standard setting approach because the standards 
failed to protect the broader financial system against systemic risk (…) 
flawed methods of assessing and managing risk, combined with 
financial product innovation and structural changes in financial 
markets, provided the ingredients that allowed risk to be underpriced 
and shifted around the financial system.7 
 
Having said that, and before getting into considering the legal aspects and 
regulatory consequences derived from the 2007 crisis, I am going to refer briefly 
to the recent financial crisis. 
 
 
2. The 2007 financial crisis: origin and development 
The chronology of the latest global financial (liquidity) crisis followed a 
path that began to be noticeable in early 2007. 
To begin with, the origin of the crisis can be tracked down to the United 
States of America (US) and its housing market. US banks, in the quest for higher 
profits, granted high-risk loans to people with poor, or for that matter non-
existent, credit records during the period before the crisis, in what it is known as 
the sub-prime mortgage business;8 subsequently, banks would bundle up these 
high-risk loans and other bonds or assets into portfolios—called collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs)—and sell them to wholesale institutional investors around 
the world—amongst other, insurance companies and investment funds—shifting 
the risk of default onto the financial system, thus creating and disseminating 
systemic risk and imposing negative externalities on the financial system, the 
economy9 and society as a whole—let us remember that the US and UK 
governments at the time used taxpayers’ money to bail out tumbling financial 
institutions. 
As house prices went down at times when interest rates went up—between 
2004-2006, a period during which interest rates rose five-fold—people with poor 
or non-existent credit records who found it difficult to honour the repayment of 
the original terms of their loans began to default on their more expensive 
obligations in great numbers; investors started to experience losses, credit 
markets started to feel the impact as banks were unwilling to lend to each other 
and liquidity started to dry up. In this context, one of the first indications of the 
approaching crisis appeared in early February 2007, when HSBC disclosed huge 
losses derived from sub-prime loans at its US mortgage business, Household 
Finance;10 and a couple of months later, another warning sign worried the 
                                          
7 Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 489. 
8 BBC News Channel, ‘Timeline’ (n 1). 
9 ibid; Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 489-90. 
10 BBC News Channel, ‘US Housing Slowdown Knocks HSBC’ BBC News (London, 8 February 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6341205.stm> accessed 12 March 2012; BBC News Channel, 
‘Global Recession Timeline’ BBC News (London) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8242825.stm> accessed 
12 March 2012. 
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markets, when one of the largest US sub-prime mortgage lenders, New Century 
Financial, filed for bankruptcy protection.11  
The markets and systemically important financial institutions being 
interconnected12 and these engineered financial products being sold globally, the 
effects of the bursting of the US housing bubble were felt not only in the US but 
also in locations such as Australia, Belgium, China, France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom (UK), despite the efforts of Central Banks to add liquidity through 
money injections into the financial system and incentivise lending between banks 
by cutting interest rates—amongst others, these were the actions taken by the 
US Federal Reserve System (FED), the Bank of England (BoE) and the European 
Central Bank (ECB).13 
This situation—absence of liquidity within financial markets; an eroded 
capital base; lack of liquidity buffers at company level; large off-balance sheet 
exposures within the shadow banking14 system15—led financial institutions to 
search for additional capital via rights issues or even government bailouts, 
triggering bank runs due to the crisis of public confidence in the solvency and 
liquidity of many of these institutions16 that forced some of these firms to either 
seek bankruptcy protection (such was the case for Lehman Brothers Bank in the 
US) or to be nationalised (like Northern Rock in the UK), and some other 
institutions even had to be taken over in order to avoid bankruptcy (like Bear 
Sterns in the US, acquired by JP Morgan Chase and Merrill Lynch in the UK, 
bought by Bank of America).17 Additionally, insurance companies that guaranteed 
sub-prime loans also felt the impact of the crisis: AIG, for instance, had to be 
rescued in mid-September 2008 by the US Treasury.18 
Additionally, a procyclical deleveraging process gave way to a rapid 
transmission of the crisis in the banking sector to the rest of the financial system 
and the real economy (i.e., contagion), resulting in a massive contraction of 
                                          
11 BBC News Channel, ‘Top US Lender in Chapter 11 Move’ BBC News (London, 2 April 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6519051.stm> accessed 12 March 2012; BBC News Channel, 
‘Global Recession Timeline’ (n 10). See also McDonnell, ‘Financial Regulation After the Storm’ (n 5): 
 
In mid-2007 concerns over an increasing number of defaults in the US subprime 
mortgage market led to large-scale rating downgrades on subprime mortgage backed 
securities and the closure of a number of hedge funds with subprime exposure. This 
resulted in a lack of confidence in structured products more generally (…) Lack of 
transparency in the market for ABS and increasing concerns about the reliability of 
ratings for structured finance products led to withdrawal by much of the market from 
investment-structured assets (…) and originators were forced to draw down bank lines 
for financing. Many banks (…) were left with CDOs on their own balance sheets or in the 
specially created SPVs, which in order to preserve their reputations, they rescued when 
in trouble. Many banks were now either left with exposure to 'toxic' ABS or with debt 
obligations that could not be financed out of their own capital. 
 
12 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems (Bank for International Settlements rev edn June 2011) (BCBS, 
Basel III) paras 4 and 32. 
13 BBC News Channel, ‘Timeline’ (n 1). 
14 Investopedia, ‘Definition of Shadow Banking System’, 
<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shadow-banking-system.asp#axzz246exLLFc> accessed 27 
July 2012: the expression ‘shadow banking’ refers to ‘The financial intermediaries involved in 
facilitating the creation of credit across the global financial system, but whose members are not 
subject to regulatory oversight (…) [and] to unregulated activities by regulated institutions’. 
15 BCBS, Basel III (n 12) paras 4 and 16. 
16 ibid para 4. 
17 BBC News Channel, ‘Timeline’ (n 1). 
18 BBC News Channel, ‘Global Recession Timeline’ (n 10). 
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liquidity and credit availability, intensifying the crisis and forcing sovereigns to 
step in and inject enormous amounts of liquidity (i.e., cash), capital support and 
guarantees.19 
For instance, the US and UK governments came up with plans for long-
term recovery in October 2008, involving US$700 billion (bn) and £400bn 
facilities to be used to purchase ‘toxic assets’ (those derived from the sub-prime 
mortgages business) and recapitalise financial institutions in exchange for a stake 
in them, in order to curb the effects of the lack of liquidity and interbank lending 
and to shore up the global financial system.20 Following this, the US Congress 
approved an additional US$787bn stimulus plan with the aim of preventing the 
US economy from falling into recession.21 
 
 
3. Regulatory and supervisory considerations 
It is clear at this point that banks and other financial institutions are 
meant to take risks, as it is the core of their business—they take risks by 
investing in order to make a profit.22 But as mentioned, the financial regulatory 
framework failed to measure and address excessive risk taking by 
undercapitalised financial institutions and the creation of systemic risk within 
financial markets, all of which, within a downturn economy, proved to be 
disastrous for all major economies as financial institutions could not weather the 
storm they created or, to say the least, fuelled by their practices. 
For instance, banks’ methodologies for the calculation of regulatory capital 
were developed on a model-based approach: banks’ value-at-risk (VaR) and 
enhanced VaR models (using its own probability of default, loss given default and 
exposure at default data) provided them with the opportunity to calculate lower 
regulatory capital than under previous regulatory capital rules (e.g., Basel I, 
according to which ‘the target standard ratio of capital to weighted risk assets 
should be set at 8%’),23 leading ‘to significantly lower levels of regulatory capital 
across most banking institutions, especially for the most systemically important 
financial institutions’.24 
In this respect, the 2007 crisis exposed the weaknesses of the regulatory 
framework of international financial standards, which allowed for the excessive 
creation of on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking sector of many 
countries; the erosion of the level and quality of the capital base; and the lack of 
liquidity buffers,25 making it impossible for the banking system to absorb systemic 
trading and credit losses.26 
                                          
19 BCBS, Basel III (n 12) para 4. 
20 BBC News Channel, ‘Global Recession Timeline’ (n 10); BBC News Channel, ‘Timeline’ (n 1). 
21 BBC News Channel, ‘Global Recession Timeline’ (n 10). 
22 Investing is a lucrative activity—financial institutions, in their role as investors, go to the capital and 
money markets to invest depositors’ money with the expectation of making a profit after a certain 
period of time. Oxford University Press, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Seventh edn, 
paperback, OUP 2005) 818. See also Alexander, Dhumale and Eatwell (n 4) 177. 
23 BCBS, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards’ (Bank for 
International Settlements July 1988) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf> accessed 18 July 2012, 
para 44. 
24 Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 491. 
25 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, ‘Guidelines on Liquidity Buffers’ (Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors 2009) <http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/Publications/Standards-
--Guidelines/2009/Liquidity-Buffers/Guidelines-on-Liquidity-Buffers.aspx> accessed 16 May 2012, 
guideline 1 and para 29: Liquidity buffers are core, highly liquid assets—eg cash—that cover the need 
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According to Brian McDonnell, the 2007 crisis was the result of several 
classic market failures, namely: 
 
[P]oor lending practices derived from moral hazard; asymmetry of 
information and the mispricing of risk; inadequately capitalised 
financial institutions funding long-term commitments out of short-term 
finance; lack of transparency to the market by banks, in particular, as 
to their exposure to toxic ABS; and driving it all, the pursuit of short-
term profits.27 
 
The 2007 crisis has also exposed major weaknesses in corporate 
governance practices within the financial sector,28 such as lack of transparency,29 
lack of a stewardship role on the part of financial firms’ executives, lack of 
ownership control, moral hazard, etc. 
All these factors evidenced by the 2007 crisis prompted a review of the 
financial regulatory and supervisory framework by the relevant authorities and 
bodies of experts at all levels, including international financial standards of good 
practice such as the Basel Capital Accord; European Union (EU) supervisory 
structures; and local (country-specific) regulations and supervisory institutions as 
in the UK. In the words of Brian McDonnell, ‘The usual response to market failure 
is government intervention in the form of “regulation”’.30 
 
 
3.1. International financial standards of good practice: soft law 
At the international level, financial regulation and supervision has been 
and is primarily the subject 
 
[O]f “international soft law” — meaning standards, guidelines, 
interpretations and other statements that are not legally binding or 
enforceable according to formal techniques of international law, but 
nevertheless are capable of exerting powerful influence over the 
behaviour of countries, public entities and private parties,31 
 
produced by international standard-setting bodies informally constituted32 
and integrated by, e.g., public officials from different countries.33 
                                                                                                                       
for additional capital that may arise in times of stress and when a financial institution needs ‘to raise 
liquidity within a short timeframe and normal funding sources are no longer available or do not 
provide enough liquidity’. 
26 BCBS, Basel III (n 12) para 4. 
27 McDonnell, ‘Financial Regulation After the Storm’ (n 5). 
28 Kern Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision: Adapting EU Institutions to Market 
Structures’ (2011) 12 ERA Forum 2 229, 231. 
29 Yeager and others, ‘US Legislation’ (n 2) 31. 
30 McDonnell, ‘Financial Regulation After the Storm’ (n 5). 
31 Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 490. 
32 As opposed to formally constituted international financial institutions—eg, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)—, which are the product of formal international treaties and whose regulatory 
measures are enforceable through formal procedures. ibid. 
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These informal international standard-setting institutions and the 
regulatory and supervisory standards they produce are as important as formal 
law, in the sense that they are a powerful influence on the behaviour of not only 
the members of the organisation, but also of other countries and public and 
private entities who may apply those standards in order to show the market some 
degree of sophistication and for other related reasons—e.g., more benign terms 
for international credit lines, reputation, etc.—; sometimes, the application of 
such standards may come as an imposition from a formally constituted 
international institution—such as the IMF.34 
Furthermore, these standards are much more flexible than formal law in 
respect of the way they are produced, and also the organisations that publish 
them are flexible in the sense that they can appraise and follow market and 
practice developments in the production of such standards, being thus able to 
adapt quickly to the changing conditions of the market; this quality, in addition to 
other benefits, makes soft law more appealing for countries and public and 
private institutions to adopt them.35 
 
 
3.1.1. The New Basel Capital Accord: Basel III 
Following from the above, and based on the idea that 
A strong and resilient banking system is the foundation for sustainable 
economic growth, as banks are at the centre of the credit 
intermediation process between savers and investors (…) [providing] 
critical services to consumers, small and medium-sized enterprises, 
large corporate firms and governments who rely on them to conduct 
their daily business, both at a domestic and international level,36 
the BCBS (Bank for International Settlements—BIS)37 has been developing 
since 1988 the Basel Capital Accord, that is, guidelines and voluntary 
international supervisory standards and rules of prudential regulation on capital 
adequacy and banking supervision intended to fulfil the Committee’s mandate, 
which is: 
[T]o enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the 
quality of banking supervision worldwide (…) by exchanging 
information on national supervisory issues, approaches and techniques, 
with a view to promoting common understanding.38 
 
The latest edition of the Accord, known as Basel III,39 was developed as a 
regulatory response to the 2007 financial crisis in order to improve risk 
                                                                                                                       
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid 490-1. 
36 BCBS, Basel III (n 12) para 3. 
37 BIS, ‘About the Basel Committee’ <http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm> accessed 14 May 2012: 
broadly speaking, the BIS is the oldest international financial organisation in the world (established on 
17 May 1930). Today it consists of Central Bank governors and senior financial advisers of countries 
represented on the Financial Stability Board (FSB), with the objective of fostering international 
monetary and financial cooperation to achieve monetary and financial stability. See also Alexander, 
‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 491. 
38 BIS, ‘About the Basel Committee’ (n 37). 
39 Comprising two separate documents: BCBS, Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk 
measurement, standards and monitoring (BIS December 2010) and BCBS, Basel III: A global 
Candidate Number F1020 
Dissertation 
LLM in International Corporate Governance, Financial Regulation and Economic Law 
 
 
 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies – Page 13 
management, governance and transparency within the financial industry,40 even 
though it has been built up on the basis of the previous edition of the Accord, 
Basel II and its 3-Pillar approach,41 thus incorporating some of the features from 
the previous framework that contributed to the escalation of the 2007 crisis.42 
The objective of the BCBS is to enhance the resilience of banks and the 
financial sector by strengthening the global capital framework; improving the 
quality and level of regulatory capital held by banks; improving market discipline 
and transparency of the capital base; and incorporating macro-prudential 
elements into the capital framework,43 all of which should ‘improve the banking 
sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, 
whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector 
to the real economy’.44 
Basel III, similarly to its predecessor, provides for a process-based 
regulatory framework or internal ratings based (IRB) approach—even though the 
BCBS has made some requirements more stringent in an attempt to make the 
regulatory system more risk-sensitive, incorporating some of the lessons learnt 
from the crisis in limited ways.45 This IRB approach means that banks have the 
flexibility to estimate the amount of a potential loss from their own evaluation of 
a borrower’s creditworthiness, thus forming the basis of minimum capital 
requirements, and that the regulatory authorities will assess and approve on a 
case-by-case basis the models for risk management and measurement developed 
by each individual bank employing its own methodology and set of data in order 
to determine its own regulatory capital structure, provided the regulator is 
satisfied with it.46 
Thus, and like Basel II, it appears that this is an incentives-based system 
in the sense that banks should find in this regulatory system an incentive to 
improve their risk-assessment and management models and procedures because 
that would in turn lead them to a lower regulatory capital to be tied up by the 
institution—the less capital an institution is forced to hold the more such 
institution has available to reinvest in the hunt for additional profits.47 And, also, 
being financial institutions in possession of the most relevant information and 
knowledge regarding their operations and the risks they are exposed to (as 
opposed to the regulator), they are in an exceptional position to provide the best 
inputs to assess such risks.48 
                                                                                                                       
regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems (BIS rev edn June 2011); see 
BCBS, Basel III (n 12) para 1. 
40 BCBS, Basel III (n 12) para 2. 
41 ibid para 7. 
42 Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 491-3. 
43 BCBS, Basel III (n 12) paras 7 and 9. 
44 ibid paras 1 and 3. 
45 Amongst other, the requirements for Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital have been strengthened in order to 
obtain a higher quality capital base; a stressed VaR capital requirement has been introduced; capital 
requirements for counterparty credit exposure to the shadow banking system and the capital buffers 
for such exposures have been strengthened; a capital charge for potential mark-to-market losses 
associated with a deterioration in the creditworthiness of a counterparty will be applied to banks; and 
the Committee considered several measures to reduce the reliance on external ratings coming from 
the previous version of the Capital Accord. BCBS, Basel III (n 12) paras 9, 12, 13, 14(b), 15. See also 
Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 492. 
46 Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 491. See also Alexander, Dhumale & 
Eatwell (n 4) 231. 
47 Alexander, Dhumale & Eatwell (n 4) 231. 
48 ibid 177. 
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Regarding the issue of procyclicality,49 Basel III has introduced a series of 
countercyclical capital requirements, such as a regulatory framework furnishing 
supervisory authorities with ‘stronger tools to promote capital conservation in the 
banking sector (…) [which] will help increase sector resilience (…) and will provide 
the mechanism for rebuilding capital during the economic recovery’;50 and the 
imposition on banks of the need to build up additional capital defences ‘in periods 
where the risks of system-wide stress are growing markedly’51 through a 
countercyclical capital buffer aimed at achieving ‘the broader macro-prudential 
goal of protecting the banking sector in periods of excess aggregate credit 
growth’;52 strong capital buffers above the minimum requirement are very 
important in order to mitigate procyclicality—by addressing excess credit 
growth—and help raise the resilience of the banking sector.53 With these 
measures, the new Capital Accord addresses both micro- and macro-prudential 
concerns, as it ensures ‘that banking sector capital requirements take account of 
the macro-financial environment in which banks operate’.54 
 
 
3.1.2. Concerns over the extent of the change within the New Basel Capital 
Accord 
Even though the Basel Committee has acknowledged that the 2007 crisis 
was due to systemic factors,55 which derived from the lack of consideration given 
to systemic risks (macro-prudential regulatory measures), the new and updated 
version of the Basel Capital Accord still relies on the enhanced IRB approach for 
the measurement of regulatory capital56 on which Basel II was built upon, 
furthering homogeneity within the banking sector—the problem is that 
homogeneity was one of the causal factors that allowed the crisis to get to such a 
destructive extent: 
 
If markets are to be liquid and reasonably stable they should have a 
wide range of participants with heterogeneous objectives and methods. 
Markets become illiquid when actions become homogeneous (…) The 
liberalisation of financial markets has reduced heterogeneity in 
financial markets. Financial sector regulators are reinforcing the 
homogenising process by encouraging firms to use the same risk 
management techniques.57 
 
                                          
49 Which was one of the main factors that deepened the effects of the liquidity crisis via the 
acceleration of the contagion effect through the quick transmission of financial shocks from the 
banking and financial sectors to the real economy; BCBS, Basel III (n 12) paras 4, 18, 26. 
50 ibid para 28. See also ibid paras 26 and 27. 
51 ibid para 136. 
52 ibid paras 30, 29 and 31, 136-150; Avinash Persaud, ‘A Critique of Current Proposals to Reform 
Bank Regulation’ (2010) 3 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 147, 148. 
53 BCBS, Basel III (n 12) paras 19, 31, 136-7; Avinash Persaud, ‘A critique’ (n 52) 148. 
54 BCBS, Basel III (n 12) para 137. 
55 ibid para 4. 
56 ibid paras 12, 14(a). 
57 European Parliament: Policy Department, Economic and Scientific Policy, ‘Financial Supervision and 
Crisis Management in the EU’ (European Parliament 2007) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201108/20110818ATT25070/20110818AT
T25070EN.pdf> accessed 4 May 2012, v. 
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The stressed VaR models remain the essential basis for the calculation of 
the risk and the determination of the regulatory capital by banking institutions 
under Basel III and the problem is that these models have proved very wrong 
during the last crisis, because they ‘massively underestimated the likelihood of 
significant fall in asset prices based on external shocks and failed to take into 
account the likelihood of numerous aftershocks’58 since they do not incorporate 
macro-prudential factors and systemic risk in the equation, such as measuring 
and limiting ‘leverage levels in the financial system as a whole, requiring financial 
institutions to have enhanced liquidity reserves against short-term wholesale 
funding exposures’.59  
Along the same lines, the BCBS has built a regulatory framework based on 
the same ‘light-touch’ approach to prudential regulation that informed Basel II 
(with a few modifications in order to strengthen the estimation of risks and the 
determination of the minimum regulatory capital base) in the sense that it still 
assumes that ‘bankers, investors and other market participants (…) [have] the 
expertise and incentives to control excessive financial risk-taking’,60 which the 
crisis has proved completely wrong, showing how those market participants 
increased systemic risks inspired by the pursuit of personal benefits—e.g., target-
related compensations or the exponential increase of profits for the banking 
institution. 
Thus, it looks like the BCBS has not been able to develop a regulatory and 
supervisory framework that properly addresses both individual firms’ and 
systemic risks by linking micro- and macro-prudential regulatory and supervisory 
aspects into one system, despite the efforts to incorporate more risk-sensitive 
regulation61 in order to tighten the requirements for the calculation of regulatory 
capital and the increase in the Tier 1 capital base in order to improve its quality 
and the liquidity of financial institutions.62 
 
 
                                          
58 Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 492. 
59 ibid: 
This market-based approach to measuring and managing risk disproportionately focused 
on the risks facing the individual firm, and not the risks facing the firm in a 
malfunctioning financial system. The economic capital models (…) failed to anticipate 
macro-prudential risks (…) and utilised risk sensitive techniques that, in the face of 
extreme events, could exacerbate systemic risks, with the potential to precipitate a crisis 
(…) Basel II embodied the failure of policymakers and regulators to incorporate systemic 
risks in the design of regulatory institutions and of risk management. 
60 ibid 489. 
61 Avinash Persaud, ‘A Critique’ (n 52) 148, argues that incorporating more risk-sensitive bank 
regulation would lead to the fallacy of the ‘risk-sensitive’ approach: ‘[I]f booms are fuelled by an 
underestimation of risks, and regulation is more sensitive to the estimation of risks, then the booms 
will be bigger and the busts deeper’. Based on the idea that this fallacy is correlated to the boom-bust 
cycle and that boom cycles share similar characteristics, he suggests as an alternative making the 
financial system less sensitive to the estimation of risks in two possible ways: the first, by allowing 
regulatory authorities to adopt counter-cyclical regulatory measures—such as to raise minimum 
capital requirements—when they recognise that a boom cycle is increasing because that means 
bankers are underestimating risks; the second option would be ‘to limit the flow of risks to institutions 
with a structural capacity for holding that risk’ based on the type of risk—that is, market risk, credit 
risk or liquidity risk—being ‘The capacity for risk (…) related to the maturity of funding’ of the 
individual firm. See also Basel Committee, Basel III (n 12) paras 29-31, 136-37; text to note 59. 
62 Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 492. 
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3.1.3. A word on the Financial Stability Board 
The FSB, an international institution that replaced the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) ten years after the latter was established,63 has been entrusted by 
G20 countries with coordinating  
 
[A]t the international level the work of national financial authorities 
and international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote 
the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other 
financial sector policies64  
 
in order to achieve and maintain financial stability. Membership obligations 
for countries comprise the need to maintain financial stability; maintain open and 
transparent financial sectors; implement international financial standards and 
agree to undergo periodic peer reviews.65 
The FSB ‘has been given responsibility (…) to approve and oversee the 
development of international financial standards that control systemic risk and 
provide more effective oversight of the global financial system’,66 including 
amongst its duties the assessment of vulnerabilities of the financial system and 
recognition of an adequate course of action to address them; the promotion of 
coordination and information-sharing between financial authorities; monitoring 
and advising on developments in the market and their implications for regulatory 
policy, and on best practice in meeting regulatory standards; undertaking joint 
strategic reviews of the policy development work of the international standard 
setting bodies; setting guidelines for supervisory colleges and supporting their 
establishment; managing contingency planning for cross-border crisis 
management; and collaborating with the IMF to conduct early warning exercises.67 
In this connection, the FSB has adopted—and periodically reviews and 
updates—a set of key standards for sound financial systems68 grouped under 12 
policy areas considered of importance ‘and deserving priority implementation 
depending on country circumstances’.69 These key standards are soft law, in the 
sense that they are not formally enforceable and have varied degrees of 
endorsement, but are nevertheless ‘accepted as representing minimum 
requirements for good practice that countries are encouraged to meet or 
exceed’.70 
Thus, the FSB is another expression of the ‘new drive to devise more 
effective international regulatory frameworks that durably link micro-prudential 
                                          
63 FSB website, ‘History’ <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm> accessed 13 July 
2012: the FSF was an international financial institution founded by G7 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors in April 1999 in order to promote stability in the international financial system by 
enhancing cooperation among national and international supervisory bodies and international financial 
institutions. 
64 FSB website, ‘Overview’ <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm> accessed 13 
July 2012. 
65 FSB website, ‘Mandate’ <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/mandate.htm> (FSB, 
‘Mandate’) accessed 13 July 2012. 
66 Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 492. 
67 FSB, ‘Mandate’ (65). 
68 ibid. See also Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems’ 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_standards.htm> (FSB, ‘Key Standards’) accessed 13 
July 2012. 
69 FSB, ‘Key Standards’ (n 68). 
70 ibid. 
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supervision with broader macro-prudential systemic concerns’,71 even though it is 
more of a coordinator in the sense that it is aimed at facilitating the work of 
national financial supervisors in coordination with other national and international 
financial standard-setting and supervisory institutions—e.g., the IMF, the Basel 
Committee, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, the 
Financial Action Task Force, etc. 
 
 
3.2. European Financial Supervision: the European System of Financial 
Supervisors 
European financial regulation was originally built on a functionalist 
approach, meaning that legislation required that the same activities were 
regulated by the same laws regardless of the institution that carried out such 
activities, and prudential supervision was conducted at the local—country—level 
via either a single regulator, a two-body regulator or a three-pillar institutional 
model;72 financial supervision of individual institutions was carried out by each 
Member State based on the principle of home country supervision, that is, 
supervision was within the remit of the supervisory authority of the jurisdiction 
where the institution was incorporated or had its headquarters, and in the case of 
a group’s subsidiary, supervision of the latter was carried out by the host 
country’s supervisory authority.73 This approach to financial regulation and 
supervision was useful as long as banking and financial activities remained within 
the same jurisdiction and when groups had a fragmented management 
structure.74 
In 1999, the EU Commission initiated the Financial Services Action Plan 
aimed at eliminating the fragmentation of the old system, harmonising the legal 
and regulatory framework for capital markets and creating an integrated 
European market in financial services and securities trading to be implemented by 
2004, and to this end, the Commission set up in July 2000 an expert advisory 
committee of ‘wise men’ chaired by Baron Alexander Lamfalussy.75 This 
committee recommended in its final report a four-level procedure for the passing 
and approval of new securities legislation, and introduced two new expert 
consultative bodies: the European Securities Committee and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators. By late 2003 two other expert committees were 
introduced: the Committee of European Banking Supervisors and the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee—improving the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the regulatory standard-setting process.76 
However, a growing interconnectedness of financial EU markets due to a 
process of increasing integration following the adoption of the single EU currency 
(via, for instance, the liberalisation of capital restrictions and increased cross-
border operations of banking and financial institutions), combined with increasing 
developments in technology (e.g., electronic exchanges and trading platforms),77 
                                          
71 Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 492. 
72 Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision’ (n 28) 233. 
73 ibid 233-34. 
74 ibid 234. 
75 Peter O Mülbert and Alexander Wilhelm, ‘Reforms of EU Banking and Securities Regulation after the 
Financial Crisis’ [2011] Banking and Finance Law Review 188; Alexander, ‘Reforming European 
Financial Supervision’ (n 28) 235. 
76 ibid. 
77 Alexander (n 27) 231-32 and 234. See also Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
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in addition to the 2007 crisis’ negative externalities and the consequential 
exposure of the weaknesses in the regulatory and supervisory framework,78 
prompted a review process of EU financial regulation and of EU regulatory and 
supervisory authorities, their functions, performance and structure,79 in much the 
way it happened both at the international level (e.g., reforms to the Basel III 
framework and the creation of the FSB) and locally (e.g., in the UK and the new 
tripartite regulatory authority that will replace the Financial Services Authority—
FSA). 
As a consequence, the European Commission, in September 2009, came 
up with plans for a change to the financial supervisory structure in place at the 
time. According to the proposal, the new supervisory authority would be a 
structured as a system—the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS)—
and consist of; a) three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) entrusted with 
providing help to restore confidence in the market; contributing to the 
development of a harmonised EU rulebook for the implementation of EU financial 
sector regulation; and solving cross-border firms-related problems; and b) a 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) assigned the task of monitoring and 
preventing the accumulation of systemic risks that ‘threaten the stability of the 
overall financial system’,80 linking both micro- and macro-prudential supervision.81 
A year later, on 22 September 2010, the European Parliament voted for the 
proposal—later confirmed by the EU Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN) on 17 November 2010—creating the ESFS and confirming its structure 
and composition (graphic 1),82 operative since January 2011 in replacement of the 
old supervisory framework.83 
 
Graphic 1 
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(European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission 
Decision 2009/78/EC [2010] OJ L 331/12 (EBA Regulation) para 8. 
78 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 p 1. 
79 Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision’ (n 28) 229-31. 
80 European Commission, ‘The EU Single Market: Financial Supervision’ [28 June 2012] 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/committees/index_en.htm> accessed 15 August 
2012. 
81 Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision’ (n 28) 230-1: ‘The ESA’s main function 
involve coordinating the micro-prudential supervision of Member States... while the ESRB will perform 
macro-prudential oversight and surveillance of systemic risk in EU and global financial markets’. 
82 European Commission, ‘The EU Single Market’ (n 80); Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial 
Supervision’ (n 28) 239. 
83 ibid 
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Source: Kern Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision: adapting EU 
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In general terms, to achieve their objectives and fulfil their tasks, the 
Agencies have been vested with authority to make decisions on the drafting and 
proposing ‘regulatory technical standards, adopting non-binding 
recommendations and guidelines, and facilitating member authorities’ 
implementation of a common EU regulatory code’ approved by the EU 
Commission, Parliament and Council.84 
This does not mean that supervision of financial markets will be taken 
from the remit of individual EU countries and transferred to the ESFS; instead, 
this is a decentralised system according to which EU Member States will still be 
responsible for the micro- and macro-prudential supervision of their financial 
institutions and internal markets—through their supervisory authorities—even 
though they have to coordinate their supervisory practices with each other and 
provide supervisory information to the relevant ESAs, and will be accountable to 
the respective ESA for such supervisory practices.85 In turn, the ESRB and each 
ESA will be accountable to the European Parliament and the Council.86 
 
 
3.2.1. The European Systemic Risk Board 
The ESRB has been created as part of the ESFS87 and based on the 
recognition that ‘financial stability is a precondition for the real economy to 
provide jobs, credit and growth’;88 the EU Commission expressed at the time that 
                                          
84 Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision’ (n 28) 245-6. 
85 ibid 243-46. 
86 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European 
Systemic Risk Board [2010] OJ L 331/1 (ESRB Regulation) Article 19; EBA Regulation Article 3; 
Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC 
[2010] OJ L 331/48 (EIOPA Regulation) Article 3; Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
(European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing 
Commission Decision 2009/77/EC [2010] OJ L 331/84 (ESMA Regulation) Article 3. 
87 ESRB Regulation Article 1(1) and (2). 
88 ibid para 1. 
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‘Given the integration of international financial markets and the contagion risk of 
financial crises, there is a need for strong commitment on the part of the Union at 
the global level’89 and, based on the De Larosière report,90 there was a ‘need to 
improve the regulation and supervision of financial institutions within the Union’.91 
The ESRB has been given the objective of monitoring the European 
financial system in order to prevent or mitigate the creation and accumulation of 
systemic risks92 arising from developments in the financial system that can 
threaten financial stability within the EU (considering macro-economic 
developments) with the aim of avoiding ‘periods of widespread financial distress… 
contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market and thereby ensure a 
sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth’.93 
To this end, the ESRB will determine, collect and analyse relevant and 
necessary information from, among others, the ESAs, the European System of 
Central Banks and the Commission; identify and prioritise risks; issue warnings 
and recommendations in response to systemic risks identified, making them 
public if it is appropriate to do so and monitor the follow-up of such warnings and 
recommendations, reporting on all recommendations and warnings to the Council 
of Ministers and to the European Parliament; collaborate with the ESAs by 
furnishing them with necessary information and helping in the development of a 
common set of qualitative and quantitative indicators to identify and measure 
risks (colour-coded system); work in coordination with International Financial 
Institutions—such as the IMF and the FSB—and relevant bodies from European 
and third countries in relation to macro-prudential oversight; and any other 
related tasks as specified by EU legislation.94 
The creation of the ESRB as a complement to the ESAs within the ESFS is 
intended to contribute to the creation of a level playing-field across European 
markets through the development of a more integrated and efficient EU 
supervisory structure that will provide the necessary macro-prudential 
assessment of the European markets and of systemic risks therein, improving 
supervisory and regulatory practices across the EU to control cross-border 
systemic risks.95 For instance, if we consider the activities carried out by 
internationally active institutions, a need appears for an increased coordination 
and cooperation among supervisors from home and host countries regarding 
information exchange in order to prudentially regulate and supervise them;96 the 
ESRB, it is expected, will provide such coordination within an integrated EU 
financial market by creating enhanced channels for the exchange of information 
(thus tackling the issue of confidentiality of certain sensitive information) based 
on a common set of supervisory standards.97 
 
                                          
89 ibid para 7. 
90 High-Level Group (chaired by Jacques de Larosière) Report of 25 February 2009. 
91 ESRB Regulation para 2. 
92 Defined as ‘[A] risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative 
consequences for the internal market and the real economy. All types of financial intermediaries, 
markets and infrastructure may be potentially systemically important to some degree’. ibid Article 
2(c). 
93 ibid Article 3(1). 
94 ibid Article 3(2), 15-18. See also Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision’ (n 28) 240-
1. 
95 Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision’ (n 28) 241. 
96 Alexander, Dhumale & Eatwell (n 4) 50. 
97 ibid 51-52. 
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3.2.2. ESAs: The European Banking Authority 
The EBA has been established as part of the ESFS98 with the objective of 
protecting the public interest through its contribution to financial stability and 
effectiveness by the improvement of the functioning of the internal market; 
ensuring that financial markets are transparent, efficient and operate with 
integrity and in an orderly manner; strengthening international supervisory 
coordination; preventing regulatory arbitrage; promoting equal conditions of 
competition; ensuring the appropriate regulation and supervision of credit and 
other risks; and enhancing customer protection.99 In this connection, it will have 
to be responsible for settling disagreements between competent authorities 
(colleges of supervisors included) from different Member States in cross-border 
situations.100 
The scope of supervisory powers conferred to the EBA include the 
supervision of activities developed by credit institutions in the pursuit of their 
business; the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions; the 
prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing; deposit-guarantee 
schemes; distance marketing of consumer financial services; payment services in 
internal markets; the business of electronic money institutions; the activities 
developed by financial institutions, financial conglomerates (to the extent that 
they develop the activities covered), investment firms, payments and money 
institutions; and any other activities and institutions as determined by future, 
legally binding Union acts.101 
The EBA will work in cooperation with the other two ESAs as well as with 
the ESRB and relevant supervisory authorities from Member States in the pursuit 
of its objective and the fulfilment of its tasks102 and, according to Regulation (EU) 
No 1093/2010 Article 21(1), it will contribute to promoting and monitoring the 
efficient, effective and consistent functioning of colleges of supervisors, which are 
institutions integrated by European Economic Area (EEA) supervisors of 
subsidiaries and branches considered significant; supervisory authorities from 
third countries with equivalent confidentiality provisions; and central banks as 
appropriate, and whose functions include the coordination of communication and 
exchange of information between supervisors; to decide on, and validate the 
model adopted by the financial group for risk-measurement and capital adequacy 
purposes; sharing and/or delegation of tasks between supervisors on a voluntary 
basis; planning and coordination of supervisory activities for the financial group; 
collaboration in the development of joint risk assessments and decisions on the 
risk-based capital requirements of the financial group; etc.103 
 
 
3.2.3. ESAs: The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
The EIOPA is the second of the ESAs created within the ESFS104 and 
sharing the same objective as the EBA: to protect the public interest by 
                                          
98 EBA Regulation Articles 1(1) and 2(1). 
99 ibid Article 1(5)(a)-(f). See also ibid Articles 8 and 9 for tasks and powers of the EBA. 
100 ibid paras 31, 32 and 36 and Article 8(b). 
101 ibid Article 1(2) and (3). 
102 ibid Article 2(1), (3) and (4). 
103 Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision’ (n 28) 244. See also, amongst other, EBA 
Regulation paras 32 and 35 and Articles 8(1)(b) and (i) and  21. 
104 EIOPA Regulation Article 1(1) and 2(1). 
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contributing to financial stability and effectiveness through the improvement of 
the functioning of the internal market; ensuring that financial markets are 
transparent, efficient and operate with integrity and in an orderly manner; 
strengthening international supervisory coordination; preventing regulatory 
arbitrage; promoting equal conditions of competition; ensuring the appropriate 
regulation and supervision of risks related to insurance, reinsurance and 
occupational pensions activities; and enhancing customer protection.105 
The EIOPA has the power to act in the fields of insurance; co-insurance; 
reinsurance; life insurance; reinsurance mediation; the prevention of money 
laundering and terrorist financing; distance marketing of consumer financial 
services; insurance undertakings, insurance groups, financial conglomerates (to 
the extent that they develop the activities covered), institutions for occupational 
retirement provision (in respect of which the EIOPA will act without prejudice to 
national social and labour law) and insurance intermediaries (including matters of 
corporate governance, auditing and financial reporting, provided that such actions 
are necessary to ensure the effective and consistent application of EU legislation); 
as well as any other activities and institutions as determined by future, legally 
binding EU regulation.106 
The EIOPA has also been established to work in cooperation with the 
ESRB, fellow ESAs and the relevant supervisory authorities and colleges of 
supervisors from EU Member Countries, being responsible for the settlement of 
disputes between competent authorities (colleges of supervisors included) from 
different EU Member States in cross-border situations.107 
 
 
3.2.4. ESAs: The European Securities and Markets Authority 
Finally, the ESMA is the third of the ESAs established to work under the 
umbrella of the ESFS.108 Its objective has been set to be the same as for the other 
two ESAs, that is, the protection of the public interest through its contribution to 
the financial stability and effectiveness of the internal market; ensuring that 
financial markets are transparent, efficient and operate with integrity and in an 
orderly manner; strengthening international supervisory coordination; preventing 
regulatory arbitrage; promoting equal conditions of competition; ensuring the 
appropriate regulation and supervision of risks; and enhancing customer 
protection.109 
The scope of action given to the ESMA comprises the supervision of 
investor-compensation schemes; securities settlement; publication of 
prospectuses on initial public offerings, securities listings and transparency of 
information when securities are admitted to trading on regulated markets; 
financial collateral arrangements; insider dealing and market manipulation; 
markets in financial instruments; undertakings for collective investment in  
transferable securities; capital adequacy of investment and credit institutions 
(without prejudice to the competence of the EBA in terms of prudential 
supervision); credit rating agencies; financial conglomerates (to the extent that 
                                          
105 ibid Article 1(2), (3), (4) and (6)(a)-(f). See also ibid Articles 8 and 9 for tasks and powers of the 
EIOPA. 
106 ibid Articles 2(1), (3) and (4). 
107 See, amongst other, ibid paras 30, 31 and 35, Articles 8(1)(b) and (i)and 21. 
108 ESMA Regulation Article 1(1) and 2(1). 
109 ibid Article 1(2), (3) and (5)(a)-(f). See also ibid Articles 8 and 9 for tasks and powers of the 
ESMA. 
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they develop the activities covered); the prevention of money laundering and 
terrorist financing; distance marketing of consumer financial services; activities of 
market participants in relation to issues not directly covered (including matters of 
corporate governance, auditing and financial reporting, provided that such actions 
are necessary to ensure the effective and consistent application of EU legislation); 
take-over bids; clearing and settlement and derivative issues; and any further 
activities and institutions as conferred by future EU legislation.110  
As with the other two ESAs, the ESMA has been established to work in 
cooperation with the ESRB, EBA and EIOPA and with the relevant supervisory 
authorities and colleges of supervisors of EU Member Countries, being responsible 
for the settlement of disputes between competent authorities (colleges of 
supervisors included) from different EU Member States in cross-border 
situations.111 
 
 
3.2.5. Concerns over the future effectiveness of the new European supervisory 
architecture 
One of the concerns raised by the current system is that the ESFS does 
not contemplate crisis management mechanisms that would allow executive 
action to be adopted by the relevant ESA or by the ESRB to address adverse 
developments that would threat financial and/or economic stability and an orderly 
functioning—in part or in total—of the EU financial system;112 even though the 
ESAs have been given powers to intervene in case of adverse developments that 
may jeopardise an orderly functioning and the integrity of financial markets or the 
stability of the EU financial system, the actions must be undertaken by the 
relevant national authority of the relevant EU Member State and not by the ESA 
whose role is limited to that of a facilitator or, eventually, coordinator of such 
actions or even issuing decisions or recommendations addressing the relevant 
national authority to take action. 113 
Another issue of concern is that, due to the interconnectedness of 
European financial markets, it would have been more convenient to establish a 
single EU supervisory authority centralising the supervision of around 50 of the 
largest financial institutions with cross-border operations throughout Europe 
which would mean supervisory jurisdiction of a single authority over the 
headquarter and foreign branches and subsidiaries of these institutions operating 
across Europe.114 In this way, the single supervisor would be able to supervise 
cross-border operations and EU-wide financial markets in a more efficient way 
than Member States’ authorities acting independently and identify cross-border 
externalities and systemic risks building up in EU financial markets, thus 
promoting ‘a level playing field in supervisory practices, coordinating and 
overseeing the activities of Member State authorities, and conducting cross-
border surveillance and enforcement’;115 additionally, a single EU regulator ‘could 
also play an important role in supervising the growing inter-connected 
infrastructure of EU capital markets, in particular clearing houses and certain 
                                          
110 ibid Article 1(2) and (3). 
111 See, amongst other, ibid paras 31, 32 and 36 and Articles Articles 2(1), (3) and (4), 8(1)(b) and (i) 
and 21. 
112 Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision’ (n 28) 252. 
113 EBA Regulation Article 18; EIOPA Regulation Article 18; ESMA Regulation Article 18. 
114 Alexander, ‘Reforming European Financial Supervision’ (n 28) 248. 
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settlement systems that operate at EU level’.116 Regardless of any considerations 
on whether it would be better to establish a single EU regulatory authority, this is 
not possible because of legal limitations crystallised on the Treaty for European 
Union.117 
 
 
3.3. Financial regulatory framework in the UK: The Financial Services Bill 
and the New Approach to Financial Regulation 
The 2007 financial crisis triggered a review of the regulatory and 
supervisory architecture at the global, regional and national levels, and the UK 
has been no exception to this trend. 
Since 1997 and up until now,118 the responsibility for financial regulation 
and supervision, and consequently for financial stability, was within the remit of 
three institutions: HM Treasury, the BoE and the FSA.119 As a consequence of the 
turmoil that engulfed the financial system, this Tripartite System was heavily 
criticised for failing to anticipate the crisis and to provide decisive leadership in 
order to resolve it, apparently due to a lack of definition of the role that each of 
those entities would play, leading to a recession that imposed huge costs on 
society and forced the government to step in and inject liquidity to save financial 
institutions from their certain collapse.120 
In addition, the FSA was criticised for implementing a ‘light-touch’ 
approach to prudential regulation that was based on the assumption that market 
participants (e.g., bankers and investors) had knowledge of the risks they were 
assuming and an incentive to control excessive risk-taking (this approach was 
clearly wrong),121 and for relying too much on ‘tick-box’ compliance, leading to a 
lack of consideration given to the build-up of systemic risks, instead of adopting a 
judgement-based approach that would implicate an in-depth, strategic risk 
analysis.122 
Having said that, after the crisis the FSA adopted a more stringent 
approach to prudential regulation and supervision by, for instance, introducing 
 
[A] new enforcement strategy of credible deterrence, resulting in a 
number of successful prosecutions for insider dealing. On the retail side 
(…) adopted a new consumer protection strategy, which incorporates 
earlier identification of risks, sector-wide interventions, and greater 
scrutiny of products and their governance, among other elements.123 
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Furthermore, the FSA also obtained a criminal conviction in March 2009 in 
a case of insider dealing124 amongst other successful prosecutions;125 resorted to 
civil proceedings were it has obtained injunctive actions to, for instance, freeze 
assets; imposed significant high profile financial penalties (fines) in the exercise 
of disciplinary measures; and showed an increased readiness to act, even though 
it has been argued that the impetus with which the FSA has been prosecuting (in 
criminal, civil and regulatory—disciplinary—cases) has been selective and directed 
to easier targets ‘for investigation and prosecution in order to secure high profile 
victories rather than (…) tackling problems which may be occurring within larger 
institutions.’126 
As a consequence, the coalition government decided to introduce a 
proposal127 to reform the UK’s financial regulatory and supervisory architecture: it 
proposed the abolition of the current system and the creation of three new bodies 
that would take on the responsibility for regulation and supervision of the 
financial sector, namely the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); the new 
system would be introduced through primary legislation (the Financial Services 
Bill 2012)128 which will make changes to the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (FSMA 2000).129 
The Financial Services Bill ‘will implement the Government’s commitment 
to strengthen the financial regulatory structure in the UK’130 and, amongst the 
above mentioned and other changes, this bill will amend the Bank of England Act 
1998, the FSMA 2000, the Banking Act 2009 and section 785 of the Companies 
Act 2006; it will also make other provisions about financial services and markets; 
and on the exercise of certain statutory functions relating to building societies, 
friendly societies and other mutual societies.131 
  
 
3.3.1. The Financial Policy Committee 
As part of the amendments of the Bank of England Act 1988,132 the FPC 
will be established as a committee of the BoE’s Court of Directors133  and will be 
                                          
124 FSA website, ‘Solicitor and his father-in-law found guilty in FSA insider dealing case’ (London, 27 
March 2009) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2009/042.shtml> accessed 
25 August 2012. 
125 Jill Treanor, ‘Bankers Beware – FSA enforcer is ready to take on the City’s chancers’ The Guardian 
(London, 14 August 2012) 23: the FSA has secured ten criminal convictions in the last 18 months, as 
it has adopted a more active role in prosecuting crime and rule-breaking in the City. 
126 Sara Teasdale, ‘FSA to FCA: Recent Trends in UK Financial Conduct Regulation’ (2011) 26(12) 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 583. 
127 HM Treasury, A New Approach (n 123). 
128 Currently with the House of Lords for enactment and intended by the Government for it to be 
implemented by early 2013 if it receives Royal Assent by the end of the current year. See also 
Graeme Barber, ‘Legislative comment: The Financial Services Bill 2012’ (2012) 33(8) Company 
Lawyer 245; HM Treasury, ‘Financial Services: The Financial Services Bill’ <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/fin_financial_services_bill.htm> accessed 29 August 2012. 
129 Perry and others, ‘The new UK regulatory landscape’ (n 119) 3-4. 
130 HM Treasury, ‘Financial Services’ (n 128). 
131 UK Parliament Website, ‘Parliamentary Business: Summary of the Bill’ 
<http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-13/financialservices.html> accessed 29 August 2012. 
132 UK Parliament, ‘Financial Services Bill’ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2012-
2013/0025/2013025.pdf> accessed 25 August 2012 s 3(1). 
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responsible for macro-prudential regulation and supervision,134 monitoring the 
financial system as a whole and addressing systemic risks and vulnerabilities that 
may arise within it and may threaten the UK’s financial stability (thereby 
improving its resilience) and the wider economy (thus enhancing macroeconomic 
stability) in order to realize its objective of protecting and enhancing financial 
stability by focusing on systemic stability.135 It will be accountable to the BoE, 
Parliament and HM Treasury, and its activities will be funded by the industry via a 
statutory levy in relation to the functions that it will get from the FSA and by a 
statutory cash ratio deposit scheme in respect of the responsibilities that it will 
inherit from the BoE.136 
Amongst its functions, the FPC will be responsible for: 
 
• [M]onitoring the financial stability of the United Kingdom's financial 
system, identifying emerging risks and vulnerabilities, and cyclical 
imbalances; 
• monitoring and assessing the activities of the PRA and the FCA, in 
order to identify any financial stability implications that may derive 
from these authorities' actions; 
• monitoring the regulatory perimeter, both to ensure that the split in 
responsibilities between the PRA and the FCA remains appropriate and 
to ensure that activities being undertaken on or outside the boundary 
of prudential regulation with potentially systemic consequences are 
understood; 
• showing a close interest in the other aspects of the Bank of England's 
work that are relevant to financial stability, such as infrastructure 
regulation, resolution arrangements for failing firms and the provision 
of liquidity insurance to the financial sector; and 
• assessing the effectiveness of the FPC's macro-prudential tools and 
considering any potential additions or adjustments to the toolkit.137 
 
In case the FPC considers it necessary to bring forward taking action in 
relation to identified risks and/or vulnerabilities, it has been empowered to give 
recommendations within the Bank, to the Treasury and to the PRA and the FCA 
which the latter bodies have to comply with, or explain the reasons for non-
compliance, and it additionally has the power to direct them in relation to the 
implementation of macro-prudential measures;138 complementarily, the FPC will 
be able to make public announcements and warnings to raise awareness; 
influence EU and international macro-prudential policy; and make 
recommendations on action to be taken by the Treasury on necessary changes to 
the FPC.139 
The commitment has been stressed in the proposal to bring transparency 
to the new system in order to create an ‘open, accountable and effective FPC’.140 
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136 Perry and others, ‘The new UK regulatory landscape’ (n 119) 9. 
137 ibid 7. 
138 HM Treasury, A New Approach (n 123) paras 2.24-25, 2.36-45. 
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In this respect, the Government will enact legislation requiring the FPC to 
publish:141 
 
- financial stability reports every six months with an assessment of the 
stability and resilience of the financial sector and a description and 
assessment of the activities developed by the FPC between reports and 
their effectiveness; and 
- minutes of meetings within six weeks of the date of each meeting, 
describing the deliberations, decisions taken and the reasoning behind 
those decisions, unless some of the issues discussed are highly 
confidential and market sensitive, in which case they will be excluded 
from the minutes. 
 
 
3.3.2. The Prudential Regulatory Authority 
As part of the modifications to be made to the FSMA 2000,142 the PRA will 
be created as a subsidiary to the BoE to be responsible for micro-prudential 
regulation, authorisation and supervision of prudentially significant firms—i.e., 
banks, investment banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers, etc.143—in its 
pursuit of its strategic objective of contributing to the promotion of financial 
stability; and of its operational objective of promoting safety and soundness of 
authorised entities including the minimisation of the possible negative 
externalities emanating from failure of any of them.144 
In order to achieve its objectives, the PRA will have regard to a common 
set of regulatory principles in order ‘to ensure that the regulators have a clear 
mandate and focus’;145 these principles are as follows:146 
 
1. The need to use resources in the most efficient and economical way; 
2. A burden or restriction should be proportionate to its expected 
benefits; 
3. Consumers should take responsibility for their decisions; 
4. The responsibilities of senior management of an authorised entity to 
comply with imposed requirements; 
5. The desirability of availability of information on authorised entities or 
recognised investment exchanges in order to contribute the 
achievement of its strategic and operational objectives by the 
Authority; finally, 
6. Transparency in the regulators’ exercise of their functions. 
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Additionally, the PRA—and, for that matter, the FCA—will be subject to 
certain specific requirements emanating from EU legislation.147 
In this context, the PRA will be empowered to assess the safety and 
soundness of firms, taking action to address any issues as appropriate; make 
prudential regulatory rules for regulated firms; authorise firms when it is satisfied 
that they will be prudentially managed and have a viable business model, and 
then supervise them (either on its own or in coordination with the FCA where 
both Authorities have interests); approve individuals to perform controlled 
functions within regulated firms; raise levies to fund itself (as it will inherit 
functions from the FSA, it is intended that the PRA will obtain funding from a 
statutory levy imposed on regulated firm and collected by the FCA).148 
Finally, the PRA will be accountable (as a subsidiarity of the BoE) to the 
BoE’s Court of Directors, in relation to administrative matters (e.g., budget, 
remuneration policy, value for money, etc.);149 to Parliament, in respect of the 
achievement of its objectives and regarding the common set of regulatory 
principles (this will be channelled through an annual report presented to the 
Treasury, who will ultimately lay it before Parliament);150 and, finally, the National 
Audit Office, who will ‘produce reports on the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of the PRA's performance, which may be scrutinised by the House of 
Commons public accounts committee’.151 
 
 
3.3.3. The Financial Conduct Authority 
Finally, the FCA will be established as ‘a separate and focused conduct 
regulator wit tailored objectives, functions and powers’.152 As the successor of the 
FSA,153 it will be responsible for the protection of consumers, for maintaining 
competition within the market and will also supervise the conduct of financial 
service providers in the wholesale and retail markets;154 adopt the legal corporate 
entity of the FSA, operating independently as a non-departmental body and its 
funding, as with the FSA, will be sourced out of fees paid by the industry.155 
Additionally, as with the PRA, the FCA will have a strategic objective—the 
protection and enhancement of confidence in the financial system; and it will 
additionally have not one but three operational objectives providing the 
foundation for an integrated conduct regulatory authority, namely:156 
 
1. Facilitating efficiency and choice in the market for financial services, 
e.g., by removing barriers; 
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2. Securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers on a case-
by-case basis—that is, considering, among other factors, the type of 
consumer, the product it is buying, the channel used for purchasing 
the product; and 
3. Protecting and enhancing the integrity and soundness of the financial 
system by, for instance, tackling market abuse and the use of the 
system for financial crime purposes. 
 
Further to these operational objectives, the FCA must discharge its 
functions in a way that promotes competition in the market, provided that it can 
do so in a manner compatible with both its strategic and operational objectives.157 
And also, the FCA will conduct its regulatory and supervisory activities based on 
the set of common regulatory principles that it will share with the PRA, that is: 
efficiency and economy in the use of resources; proportionality between burden 
or restriction imposed and the expected benefit; consumer responsibility; senior 
management responsibility; availability of information on entities and recognised 
investment exchanges; and transparency in the regulators’ exercise of their 
functions.158 
The FCA will be entrusted with the supervision of all financial institutions 
established and operating—in relation to both retail customers and dealings 
between wholesale market participants—in the UK, including those authorised and 
thus ‘regulated prudentially by the PRA and those passporting in to the UK’.159 
Furthermore, it will be responsible for regulating the wholesale market conduct of 
market participants dealing or trading in markets and wholesale firms internally 
and in relation to their customers and clients.160 Finally, the FCA will be 
responsible for both the authorisation and supervision of financial firms that do 
not fall within the remit of the PRA, being additionally responsible in respect of 
them for the provision of a prudential regulatory framework.161 
On the other hand, the FCA will be empowered to enforce conduct and 
prudential rules, being able to impose high fines in order to encourage compliance 
across the financial sector, and it will even be able to use redress to ‘secure 
better outcomes for retail customers who have not been treated fairly’.162 
 
 
3.4. The US response to the financial crisis: the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council 
As a consequence of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the US Congress 
adopted in 1933 the Glass-Steagall Act in order to limit excessive risk taking by 
banks because this was one of the main factors contributing to the Great 
Depression, and created ‘a firewall between commercial and investment banking 
by forbidding the former from underwriting securities’.163 This Act, later 
complemented by the Bank Holding Company Act 1956, lead to ‘a period of 
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almost 50 years of stability in the financial sector’,164 until lobbyists’ pressures 
started to gain ground and obtained the slow but increasing relaxation of the 
limitations imposed by the above mentioned statutes, until the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act and the deregulation of the financial services industry achieved 
with the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act 1999.165 
Such a change in the legal framework lead to the exponential growth of 
the sub-prime mortgage business that fuelled a housing market bubble: banks 
were able to provide funding to the sub-prime mortgage business because they 
were able to securitise those toxic assets, take them out of their balance sheets 
and transfer those individual risks to the market, thereby creating, piling up and 
spreading systemic risk; however, increasing interest rates during 2004-2006 
forced growing amounts of sub-prime mortgage holders to default on their 
payments; eventually, this caused the housing market bubble to burst, leading to 
the collapse of the financial system, bringing the US economy and the country to 
its knees, and forcing the US Government to intervene twice with the injection of 
colossal levels of liquidity (ultimately funded by the taxpayer) to keep the 
economy—and the country—afloat through the recapitalisation of ‘too big to fail’, 
systemically important financial institutions. 
 
 
3.4.1. The Dodd-Frank Act 2010 
With that situation as the background, the US Congress passed the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act 
2010), according to the Preamble: 
 
To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘‘too big 
to fail’’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes. 
 
The Act thus intends to restore confidence in financial institutions and the 
financial system through the generation of a systemic change,166 meaning a 
modification of the conditions and practices that lead to the crisis by changing the 
approach to regulation and supervision from ‘light-touch’167 to a more invasive 
one: amongst other things, the Act provides for the imposition of limits to the 
acceptable levels of risk to be assumed by an institution; the implementation of 
risk-reduction mechanisms within the financial system; the creation of a Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), entrusted with the prudential supervision of 
the US financial system in order to identify and limit excessive risk creation and 
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empowering it with the necessary tools to achieve this objective; and the 
requirement for large and complex companies to ‘periodically submit plans for 
their orderly shutdown should the company’168 defaults and goes bankrupt.169 
 
 
3.4.2. Financial Stability Oversight Council 
The establishment of the FSOC170 is another representation of the 
commitment of the US authorities to change the financial supervisory landscape. 
The FSOC is a collaborative body responsible for the macro-prudential supervision 
of the US financial system and the institutions operating within it to identify and 
limit excessive risk creation, and as such, is responsible for the monitoring of the 
financial system in order to identify potential threats to its stability and to 
respond accordingly.171 
According to section 112(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the objective 
assigned to the FSOC comprises: 
 
1. To identify risks to the financial stability of the US that could arise from 
financial distress, failure or ongoing operations of systemically 
important financial institutions, or that could arise outside the financial 
services industry; 
2. To promote market discipline; and 
3. To respond to emerging threats to the stability of the US financial 
system. 
 
To achieve this, the FSOC has been granted powers to, amongst other, 
collect information; monitor the financial services industry; monitor domestic and 
international proposals and developments and provide advice and 
recommendations to the Congress to enhance the integrity, efficiency, 
competitiveness and stability of the financial system; facilitate regulatory 
coordination and information sharing between Federal and State relevant 
agencies;  advise member agencies on general supervisory priorities and 
principles; identify systemically important financial market utilities and payment 
settlement activities; and advise primary financial regulatory agencies on the 
application of new or heightened (stricter) financial standards.172 
In the discharge of its duties, the FSOC can make recommendations to the 
FED for the provision of tougher rules on, e.g., capital, liquidity and risk 
management in order to limit the growth in size and complexity of companies and 
to limit companies that can pose systemic risks; it can also require the FED to 
regulate a nonbank financial institution if the latter could pose a threat to 
financial stability (section 113); it can impose a 15-1 leverage requirement if a 
company poses a threat to financial stability (section 165(j)(1)); and as a 
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measure of last resort, it can approve a FED decision to require a large and 
complex financial institution to divest some of its holdings if such an entity would 
pose a grave threat to the functioning of the US financial system (section 
121(a)(5) Dodd-Frank Act).173 
 
 
4. A word on the problem of Moral Hazard and its role in furthering the 
crisis 
Moral hazard has played an important, and even crucial role in the 
development of the 2007 crisis as financial and banking institutions resorted to 
poor lending practices in the search for increasing short-term profits in the period 
before the crisis hit the markets: they provided funding to risky borrowers (e.g., 
sub-prime mortgage business) because securitisation allowed banks to remove 
those assets (sub-prime debt) from their balance sheets by selling them to a 
standard purpose vehicle (SPV) which would subsequently issue asset backed 
securities (ABS) and sell them on the market, shifting such risks around the 
market and increasing systemic risks, with the additional problem that wholesale 
investors purchasing those ABS did not fully comprehend the risks incorporated in 
them due to a lack of transparency and disclosure by banking institutions of the 
real nature behind those ABS at the time of the sale (asymmetry of 
information).174 
By securitising, banking institutions would not only find an alternative 
source of funding after exhausting traditional ones (e.g., deposits),175 but would 
also remove debt from their balance sheets, which had the obvious benefit of 
reducing their risk profile, thus reducing the minimum capital requirement, which, 
in turn, provided these institutions with more available capital to reinvest, for the 
lower the risk profile of the individual institution the less capital it needs to hold in 
order to guarantee possible expected and unexpected losses. 
Furthermore, within this process of securitisation credit rating agencies 
would play a significant part as well due to the above mentioned lack of 
information—instead of rating the ABS issued by the SPV as based on the nature 
of the ABS and the assets that backed those ABS (as they should have done in 
order to counter the lack of transparency in these instruments), they would rate 
them as based on the characteristics of the SPV in terms of its capacity to repay 
principal and interest to the holder of the ABS on redemption; by doing this, ABS 
would achieve higher ratings, making them more appealing to potential buyers;176 
if credit rating agencies rated ABS as based on the quality of the sub-prime loans 
backing those securities, the latter would probably have been rated very poorly 
(due to the riskiness of the holder of the sub-prime loan) and consequently would 
not have sold on the markets. 
Brian McDonnell goes further and argues that: 
 
                                          
173 US Senate Committee on Housing, Banking and Urban Affairs, ‘Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank 
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investor to analyse the value of the securities themselves, their complexity and the need for 
information on the underlying assets often made this impracticable’. 
175 ibid. 
176 ibid. 
Candidate Number F1020 
Dissertation 
LLM in International Corporate Governance, Financial Regulation and Economic Law 
 
 
 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies – Page 33 
Usually the securities needed to be AAA rated to sell and would be 
structured to achieve this increasingly with the help of the credit rating 
agencies who would suggest improvements and credit enhancements 
based on their models; clearly a conflict of interest.177 
 
This reliance on third party credit ratings has shown the emergence of two 
problems related to private credit rating agencies: firstly, and in accordance with 
McDonnell’s statement, the risk that these agencies act in their own interest or 
the borrower’s in order to maximise their gains by issuing favourable ratings; and 
second the quality of each rating agency’s assessment and of the standards they 
applied to rate companies and securities.178 
These agencies should have acted to reduce the asymmetric information 
problem when rating those ABS as they should have had the necessary expertise 
and adequate incentives to perform their assessments and ratings knowledgeably 
and faithfully,179 not only of the creditworthiness of the SPV issuing the securities, 
but also of the securities and the particular issues throughout their life180 to 
provide additional reassurance to potential purchasers who did not usually have 
access to complete information on the ABS. 
If we bear in mind that credit ratings agencies charged fees (incentives) to 
produce their ratings and that those fees are paid by the institutions selling the 
ABS being rated, this is a clear case of manipulation of information and 
misrepresentation to the investment community and general public derived from 
the expectation of maximising their own gains181—also, a clear case of moral 
hazard. 
Another source of moral hazard-related market failures derive from the 
fact that governments granted huge bailouts to ailing banking and financial 
institutions in order to keep them afloat due, amongst other reasons, to their 
systemic importance (they were ‘too big to fail’), signalling to the market that, no 
matter how risky some transactions are and the number of them, no matter how 
indebted a financial institution has got after failing to price correctly the risks it 
has taken (putting itself in the position of being unable to afford the 
consequences of excessive risk taking), the government will pick up the bill and 
pay for those market failures (regardless of the source of the funds—e.g., 
taxpayers’ money or proceedings from a sale of government bonds).182 The too-
big-to-fail doctrine can induce moral hazard because large financial institutions 
will take on excessive risks knowing that there is a lender of last resort (in this 
case, the government) providing the funding needed to avoid bankruptcy.183 
Hence, it is possible to appreciate the extent to which moral hazard 
contributed to the under-pricing of individual financial and banking institutions’ 
risks and to the shifting of such risks around the market, and how these market 
failures were encouraged by the expectation of exponentially growing profits and 
                                          
177 ibid. See also Alexander, Dhumale and Eatwell (n 4) 232. 
178 Alexander, Dhumale & Eatwell (n 4) 232. 
179 Stephen J Choi and Andrew T Guzman, ‘National Laws, International Money: Regulating in a Global 
Capital Market’ (1996-1997) 65 Fordham Law Review 1855, 1901. 
180 Geoffrey Fuller, The Law and Practice of International Capital Markets (LexisNexis Butterworths 
2007) paras 1.175, 1.179 and 1.190. 
181 Alexander, Dhumale and Eatwell (n 4) 232. 
182 A good starting point is the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, which states in its Peamble that it will 
protect the taxpayer ‘by ending bailouts’, showing explicitly to the market and to financial institutions 
that it will not recapitalise them should they go bust. 
183 Alexander, Dhumale & Eatwell (n 4) 30. 
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target-related rewards (e.g., bonuses),184 driving bank executives and other staff 
to take excessive risks and transfer them onto the market, and credit rating 
agencies to advise banking and financial institutions on how to structure 
securities issues in order to grant them the highest ratings for the instruments to 
be more marketable, without taking into consideration the full extent of the 
implications of their ratings for overall systemic risk, contributing significantly to 
the development of the crisis.185 
 
 
5. Too-Big-to-Fail doctrine: a comment on competition issues during the 
height of the crisis 
From the liquidity crisis and subsequent recession that engulfed 
international financial markets flowed the idea of ‘too big to fail’ financial 
institutions: in fact, some these ‘too big to fail’ banking and financial institutions 
justified governmental intervention in the US and the UK with huge amounts of 
liquidity to keep them afloat, due to its systemic importance. 
Additionally, for instance, the UK Government allowed and even pushed 
forward a merger of two very big financial institutions, Lloyds TSB and HBOS, 
even though this meant that the first of them took over the latter in a £12bn 
deal, giving birth to a banking giant that held almost one third of the UK’s savings 
and mortgage market based on the assumption that any failure of HBOS would 
damage the UK—a transaction considered to be 
 
[T]ruly exceptional in its scale and would not usually be allowed. ‘It's 
the kind of the deal that ministers would normally expect the 
competition watchdogs to block’ (…) But on this occasion they are 
using a national interest clause in competition law to override any 
objections the watchdogs would have’.186 
 
These examples show that regulators not only allowed financial institutions 
to grow in size and (systemic) importance, but at some point made it happen 
(forced by circumstances some might say) for if the governments of the US and 
the UK had to recapitalise these institutions because they were ‘too big to fail’, it 
was due to letting them grow and get such systemic importance in the first place. 
According to the too-big-to-fail doctrine, the fact that there is a lender of 
last resort (whether a central bank or the government for that matter) can induce 
moral hazard: management and owners of large financial institutions will take on 
excessive risks and will manage their risk exposure less diligently in the 
knowledge that there is an institution that will provide the necessary liquidity to 
stay afloat and prevent a possible ‘domino effect’ that could affect other financial 
institutions.187 
                                          
184 McDonnell, ‘Financial Regulation After the Storm’ (n 5). See also Alexander, ‘Rebuilding 
International Financial Regulation’ (n 3) 489: ‘Executive compensation contributed to excessive risk-
taking at banks and other financial institutions, while institutional shareholders failed to exercise an 
effective stewardship role to curb the excessive risk-taking of senior management’. 
185 Alexander, Dhumale & Eatwell (n 4) 233. 
186 BBC News Channel, ‘Lloyds TSB seals £12bn HBOS deal’ BBC News (London, 17 September 2008) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7622180.stm> accessed 22 July 2012. 
187 Alexander, Dhumale & Eatwell (n 4) 30. 
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Having said that, according to Avinash Persaud it is not a matter of 
financial institutions ‘being too big to fail’ in a context of lack of liquidity, because 
banks are ‘intrinsically illiquid institutions. It does not take a large failure to lead 
to panic (…) we can have a large boom and subsequent crash, with the same 
economic misery, in a world of only small banks as in a world of large banks’.188 
The response to this problem has been to impose limits to the growth of 
financial institutions through the imposition of tighter capital requirements and 
even by empowering the regulator to adopt highly intrusive measures, such as 
the imposition of divestments in extreme circumstances contemplated under 
section 121(a)(5) of the Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
On the other hand, the European Commission forced Lloyds to divest, 
ordering the sale of 632 branches but did not allow any of the UK’s big banks to 
bid for it precisely in order to promote competition.189 And on top of that, the UK’s 
Competition Commission intended to force Lloyds to dispose of additional 
branches in an attempt to improve competition in the financial market,190 as there 
were concerns over the position of Lloyds after the takeover of HBOS—a report of 
the Treasury Select Committee concluded in April 2011 that the bank was in a 
‘powerful position (…) [that] could be damaging competition in the UK’.191 
Finally, let us remember now that the FCA will have to discharge its 
functions, once established, in a way that promotes competition in the market if it 
can do so in a manner compatible with both its strategic and operational 
objectives.192 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
It has been stated that: 
 
The primary role of international banking regulation (…) should be to 
promote the efficient pricing of financial risk in all financial systems 
and to ensure that regulators focus not only on the amount of risk 
created by individual financial institutions but also on the aggregate 
amount of risk created by all financial institutions in global financial 
markets.193 
 
In this respect, the regulatory and supervisory infrastructures of the EU, 
the UK and the US have been modified and updated as a consequence of the 
                                          
188 Avinash Persaud, ‘A Critique’ (n 52) 147-8. 
189 Robert Preston, ‘Lloyds sale of Verde hits huge obstacle’ BBC News (London, 14 June 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13761449> accessed 22 July 2012. See also Phillip Inman, 
‘Lloyds agrees branch deal with Co-op’ The Guardian (London, 27 June 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jun/27/lloyds-branches-co-op-nbnk> accessed 14 August 
2012: The deal was finally closed with The Co-ooperative Bank. 
190 Harry Wilson, ‘Competition Commission investigation into UK banking “inevitable” The Telegraph 
(London, 25 May 2011) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8534251/Competition-
Commission-investigation-into-UK-banking-inevitable.html> accessed 28 September 2011. 
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industry-competition> accessed 28 September 2011. 
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2007 liquidity crisis that also prompted a revision of international financial 
standards (e.g., the Basel Capital Accord), all this with the aim of promoting the 
efficient pricing of risks—i.e., both individual firms’ and systemic risks. 
Basel III has been built upon the principles and structure of its previous 
edition and has adopted the same approach to financial regulation and 
supervision, therefore still bringing homogeneity to the market and still relying in 
IRB models; and it does not adequately address both individual firms’ and 
systemic risks by linking micro- and macro-prudential regulatory and supervisory 
aspects into one system, even though it has incorporated new, more stringent 
risk-sensitive requirements for the calculation of regulatory capital and the 
increase in the Tier 1 capital base to improve its quality and the liquidity of banks. 
On the bright side, the BCBS has publicly said that ‘banks must reveal ‘all 
the components’ of their capital from 30 June next year, as their progress in 
building up buffers is monitored by authorities (…) [for it] wants to ensure that 
lenders are falling in line with new Basel III rules’,194 signalling its intention to 
bring more transparency to the market by enhancing the quality and level 
disclosure on the part of financial institutions; this, in turn, will allow supervisors 
to assess in detail the capital position of banks. It remains to be seen whether 
Basel III will be able to achieve its objective and address both micro- and macro-
prudential concerns and make the system more resilient. 
The EU, on the other hand, has developed a regulatory and supervisory 
system that links both macro-prudential supervision of the EU financial system 
(ESRB) with micro-prudential supervision of financial institutions (ESAs) and 
coordinates the supervisory activities of EU Member States, standardising such 
practices and creating a level playing-field all across the EU, even though it has 
not been provided with centralised powers for crisis management to allow the 
new bodies to take executive action to address adverse developments that may 
threat financial and/or economic stability and the orderly functioning of the 
European financial system. 
At the national level, the new regulatory and supervisory architecture in 
the UK incorporates a more macro-prudential and invasive approach to regulation 
and supervision: the FPC will be responsible for supervising the financial system 
in the UK in order to identify and address the creation of systemic risks, and the 
other two bodies, the PRA and the FCA, will work in coordination with the FPC and 
with each other while supervising individual institutions, thus linking micro- and 
macro-prudential supervisory activities. There are concerns, however, as to the 
Bank of England’s powerful role after the Financial Services Bill gets Royal Assent: 
Kate Barker, a long-standing member of the Monetary Policy Committee, said 
that ‘the steady erosion of democratic control over regulation of the financial 
system would accelerate under proposals by the coalition government to create a 
super-watchdog in Threadneedle Street’ (i.e., the Bank of England).195 Again, it 
remains to be seen whether the new system will be able to achieve its objectives. 
Finally, these and other initiatives (e.g., the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 and the 
creation of the FSOC in the US) intend to address corporate governance concerns 
by bringing more transparency to the market and also aim at addressing 
competition concerns by limiting the growth of financial institutions up to the 
point of being ‘too big to fail’. Finally, these initiatives, through the tightening of 
capital requirements (both the amount and quality of capital to be held by banks) 
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in relation to the risk profile of the institution, aim at addressing moral hazard 
concerns. 
All these changes and the adoption of the above mentioned and other 
measures will directly impact compliance by financial institutions, as they will be 
scrutinised more intensely: no more ‘light-touch’ and ‘tick-box’ supervision means 
that supervisors will now get more involved and thus financial institutions will 
have to show and convince the authorities that they are holding enough capital in 
relation to their risk profile and that they are not irresponsibly creating and 
spreading systemic risks, and also that they are not growing and getting such a 
systemic importance that may threaten the stability of the financial system. But 
only future will tell whether these changes in regulation and supervisory practices 
are enough to recognise and address threats to financial stability and to provide 
for the orderly functioning of the market. 
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